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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Big Tech Merger Concern
The term “Big Tech” is referred to: Amazon, Apple, Facebook (Meta),
Google and Microsoft. These companies are the five largest multinational online
service or computer hardware and software companies and have the top position
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in the stock market by market share1 Data indicated that these five firms have
made over 700 acquisitions from 1987 to 20192 (Google 32%, Microsoft 31%,
Apple 15%, Amazon 11%, and Facebook 11%). After 2001, The DOJ and FTC
began to use NAICS codes to report HSR (Hart-Scott-Rodino) transactions. The
code name is NAICS 518 for data processing, hosting, and related services
(mainly including Google, Amazon, Facebook)3 Over 200 transactions were
reportable between 2001 and 2017 and only one of which was challenged by the
DOJ in federal district court – the Google/ITA case4 This rate, as a percentage
of transactions cleared to the agencies over the period, is about 3%, which is
significantly lower than that of 13% across all sectors5
All this data raises controversy in relation to the effects of the dominance
and overpowering of the Big Tech to innovation and market entry; incentives to
compete on price and nonprice dimensions; and the potential for AI-driven
biased pricing and other theories of harms6. In realising this growing power of
the Big Tech and underenforcement in regulations, US Senator Josh Hawley
proposed the bill of “Bust Up Big Tech Act” on April 19 th 20217, which will
“crack down on mergers and acquisitions by mega-corporations and strengthen
antitrust enforcement to pursue the breakup of dominant, anticompetitive firms”,
according to him8
B. Motif
In section 2, this article examines the US regulations on both horizontal and
non-horizontal mergers and the evolution of the law in the past 60 years. In
section 3, the article looks at how the law interacts with the Big Tech merger
1 Andrea Murphy & Isabel Contreras, The Global 2000, FORBES (May 12, 2022 6:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/lists/global2000/?sh=2a2f8a7c5ac0#HEADER:MARKETVALUE_SORTREVERSE:
TRUE.
2 Id.
3 NAICS Code 518 Description, SICCODE, https://siccode.com/naics-code/518/data-processing-hostingservices (last visited October 14, 2022).
4 Lina M. Khan & Richard A. Powers, Hartt-Scott-Rodino Annual Report Fiscal Year 2020, tab. X,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/hart-scott-rodino-annual-report-fiscal-year-2020/fy2020__hsr_annual_report_-_final.pdf.
5 Id.
6 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1775 (2017).
7 S.1204 – BUST UP BIG TECH ACT, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/senate-bill/1204/cosponsors (LAST VISITED OCT. 12, 2022).
8 Senator Hawley Introduces the ‘Trust-Busting for the Twenty-First Century Act’: A plan to Bust Up
Anti-Competitive Big Business, JOSH HAWLEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MISSOURI (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-trust-busting-twenty-first-century-act-plan-bustanti-competitive-big.
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and acquisition activities and introduce the shortcomings to the existing system.
In section 4, the article in-depth analyses the theories of harm and what would
happen if an authority banned all the mergers and acquisitions for the Big Tech.
In section 5, the article briefly expresses the authors’ view regarding to what
extend the authors agree with “The Big Ban(g) Theory”.
II. HOW DOES THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK ADDRESS MERGERS?
A. General Note
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act9 placed responsibility to
review mergers to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
The two “big guns” in the legislation are the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Clayton Act10 While s. 2 of the Sherman Act is concerned with unilateral
exclusionary conduct, s. 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions
that may ‘substantially lessen’ competition11
For the procedures of a merger case: firstly, very large mergers will be
notified to both the DOJ and the FTC before the merger’s completion per HSR
threshold requirement12; secondly, the agencies would negotiate with the
merging entities; finally, the binding result of negotiations would be in either a
Consent Order by the FTC or a Consent Decree by the federal court at the request
of the DOJ13 After the second stage, the negotiations could lead to a clearing of
the transaction; or initiating proceedings to block it; or reaching a remedial
agreement with the parties to alleviate possible competition concerns14.
B. Horizontal Merger Control
Professor Carl Shapiro15 had observed a gradual weakening of the US
antitrust law on horizontal mergers. Three stages can be roughly divided:
9 HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976, PL 994-435 (CODIFIED AT 15 U.S.C.A.
CH. 34).
10 SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT OF 1890 (26 STAT 209, 15 USC 1-7); CLAYTON ANTITRUST ACT, AMENDMENT
OF US CONGRESS TO THE SHERMAN ACT IN 1914 (15 USC 13).
11 ACQUISITION BY ONE CORPORATION OF STOCK OF ANOTHER, 15 U.S.C.A. §18 (1996)(WEST).
12 THOMAS E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union: Some Observations,
74 St. John’s L.Rev. 305 , 309-10 (2000).
13 GEORGE METAXAS ET AL, MERGER REVIEWS IN THE US AND THE EU: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW, GLOBAL
COMPETITION
REVIEW
57,
57
(2006)
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hoganlovells/pdf/publication/2206globalisation_pdf.pdf.
14 15 U.S.C.A. §18.
15 CARL SHAPIRO, PROTECTING COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MERGER CONTROL, TECH TITANS,
LABOR MARKETS, 33 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 69, 73 (2019).
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The article calls the first stage the “golden era” of the “structural
presumption”. In Philadelphia National Bank16, the Supreme Court held that any
merger that would result in a “significant increase in the concentration of firms
in that market is inherently likely to lessen competition substantially” by holding
an undue percentage share. Mergers will only be allowed if this presumption can
be rebutted by clear evidence. In a subsequent case17, the court ruled out efficiencies as a defence to illegality. The 1968 Merger Guideline reflected these
rulings and focused largely on the market shares of the merging firms.
The second stage marked the fall of “structural presumption” (this can be
partially accredited to Chicago School’s pro-efficiency merger revolution). In
the DOJ’s 1982 Merger Guidelines, they gave less weight to market shares and
raised the threshold levels of concentration that would trigger the structural
presumption. To make things worse, the DC Circuit departed from the Supreme
Court’s 1960s precedents and stated that “evidence of market concentration
simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future
competitiveness”18
The third stage was the rise of the “effect-based approach”. Three subsequent
revisions were made on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992, 1997, and
2010, where less weight was given to market shares and greater weight to the
effect of the merger on competition. The 1992 Guidelines introduced “unilateral
effects” to focus on loss of direct competition; the 2010 Guidelines
supplemented with concepts of upward pricing pressure, merger simulation, and
bidding and auction model.
C. Non-Horizontal Merger Control
1. Pre 2020
Non-horizontal merger enforcement observed a similar trend as its horizontal
counterpart, although with arguably less scrutiny19:
In 1950, the Clayton Act had no definition of what conduct substantially
lessens competition or tends to create monopolies, so the court used to apply a
higher level of scrutiny in non-horizontal merger cases.
16

United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 589 (1967) (“Possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality.”).
18 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
19 Steven C. Sallop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the US Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an
Interim Guide for Practitioners, J. Antitrust Enforc., 2015, at 1.
17
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The two leading cases from the 1960s highlighted the harm of foreclosure in
Brown Shoe 196220 and entrenchment in Procter 1967. The 1968 Merger
Guidelines included both theories.
But in the 1970s, the Chicago School criticises the approach by stating there
is obvious advantages in improving economic efficiency21 In response to this
criticism, agencies and courts dramatically changed their attitude toward
enforcement for non-horizontal mergers. And unsurprisingly in 1982’s revision
of DOJ’s Guidelines, they omitted the foreclosure and entrenchment theories
and replaced them with a presumptive standard of efficiency for non-horizontal
merger enforcement and added some empirical analytical tools including
Hypothetical Monopolist Test and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Two years later in 1984, the DOJ published a slightly revised version of the
Guideline. It still left out the foreclosure theory, which is the theory of harm
alleged in almost 70% of non-horizontal merger enforcement actions brought by
the DOJ and FTC between 1995 to 201522
2. Post 2020
On June 30th, 2020, the DOJ and FTC replaced the 1984 Non-Horizontal
Merger Guidelines with the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMG). As
Michael Salinger23 commented the guidelines are “muddying the waters instead
of clarifying them”, the guidelines were not making the agencies life easier.
However, in September 2021, President Biden’s FTC rescinded it, claiming they
represented a “flawed economic theory regarding purported pro-competitive
benefits of mergers”.

20
21

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Charles A. Miller, Big Data and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 318, 319

(2019).
22

Sallop, supra note 19.
Michael A. Salinger, The New Vertical Merger Guidelines: Muddying the Water, 59 Rev. Ind. Organ.
161, 162-171 (2021).
23
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III. WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS TO THE CURRENT LEGAL/REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK?
A. Weak Horizontal Merger Enforcements24
On April 9, 2012, Facebook announced its acquisition of Instagram at $1
billion, The FTC reviewed the acquisition and on August 22 the same year
closed the investigation without taking an action25 However, many scholars26
including the FTC in 202027 regard Instagram would have been a direct
competition to Facebook. The 2012 acquisition was never brought up in court,
but Professor Click28 named four hurdles the agencies would have had to
overcome to succeed in court under his “potential competition doctrine”.
First, the 1984 Guidelines purported that a challenge is unlikely if
concentration in the acquired firm’s market is below 1800HHI (the measure for
social networking market would be satisfied but not for display advertising
market)29 Second, the DOJ will not challenge a potential competition merger if
entry into the market is easy (but data barrier is hard to measure and in digital
advertising market even adjacent firms can become competitors)30 Third, if entry
is not easy, then the DOJ must show that Instagram had an entry advantage not
possessed by three or more firms (however, Facebook can argue Instagram was
just one of many potential entrants into social networking) 31 Finally, the
government must show that Instagram’s entry into the social networking or
advertising markets would deconcentrate the market or have a significant procompetitive effect (but Instagram had not entered the digital advertising market
yet, thus it was impossible to establish a procompetitive effect)32

24 Diana L. Moss, The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech, AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE
(Jul.
8,
2019),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/MergerEnforcement_Big-Tech_7.8.19.pdf.
25 Claire Y. Cho, Mergers and Acquisitions in Digital Markets, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Mar.
30, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46739.pdf.
26
E.g., Miller, supra note 21; Mark Glick & Catherine Ruetschlin, Big Tech Acquisitions and the Potential
Competition Doctrine: The Case of Facebook, INSTITUTE FOR NEW ECONOMIC THINKING (Oct. 2019),
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP-104-Glick-and-Reut-Oct-10.pdf.
27 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34, 52-61 (D.D.C. 2022) (stating FTC alleged
Facebook has maintained its monopoly position by buying up companies that pose a threat).
28 Glick & Ruetschlin, supra note 26.
29 Id. at 33.
30 Id. at 35.
31 Id. at 37.
32 Id. at 39.
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Although it is unknown why he based his ‘potential doctrine’ on the 1984
Guidelines considering the 2010 version was long published, the hurdles should
apply, and the three subsequent updates only added more challenges to the
already daunting task for the FTC. One can see, it is virtually impossible for the
authorities to succeed in even such a “classic horizontal merger” case like
Facebook/Instagram. The author concluded the Chicago School influenced
doctrine as “…essentially ties the hands of the antitrust agencies because it
demands levels of proof that are intractable…”.
B. Weak Non-Horizontal Merger Enforcement33
This is a typical example of how a vertical data-related merger in a non-price
market received insufficient scrutiny. ITA Software is a firm who provides
algorithms for travel sites to find and book flights. Google and ITA are not direct
competitors, but ITA can help with one of the services Google provides – Google
Flights, which puts them in a vertical relationship.
The 1984 NHMG did not provide guidance on non-price harms, foreclosure,
entrenchment, and price discrimination, thus, at the time of the case, the
Guidelines might be insufficient for the agencies to succeed at court. The DOJ
nonetheless challenged the deal by filing a complaint on April 8, 2011, but
mainly based its case on foreclosure theory (which is not even in the 1984
NHMG) that Google might foreclose competitor travel sites from using ITA’s
algorithm after the merger34 Unsurprisingly, in the end, DOJ did not block the
merger and settled for a consent decree to have Google’s promise to allow other
competitor sites to use the algorithm for five years.
The decision’s inadequacy is two-fold: one, the Consent Decree might not
be sufficient to maintain the competition and two, five years merely slowed
down the foreclosure but did not end it. For the former, Google could simply
make their Google Flights widget more favourable upon users’ searches – they
did not even need to stop other competitors from using the algorithms to beat
them because the competitors’ results simply would not show up at the top. For
the latter, it did not take Google long to exclude the competitor’s access to ITA’s

33

COMPLAINT, UNITED STATES V. GOOGLE INC., NO. 1:11-CV-00688, 2011 WL 1338047 (D.D.C. APR. 8,

2011).
34

Id.

2022]

THE BIG BAN(G) THEORY

61

algorithm after 201635 and as a result, Google’s advertising revenue from Google
Flights has been estimated to be larger than all its competitors combined36
Before moving on to discuss the pros and cons of imposing an absolute ban
on the Big Tech, it is useful to summarise the current limitations within the US
antitrust regulatory framework. The AAI White Paper37 has neatly done so:
First, the Big Tech may purposely and strategically pursue deals that are
unlikely to trigger antitrust concerns38 Second, the agencies are reluctant to
challenge acquisitions of nascent rivals39 Third, enforcers have an inadequate set
of tools to deal with the complexity raised by Big Tech business models40 And
lastly, as the article demonstrated in detail earlier on, because of current
unworkable merger presumptions and Big Tech firms’ unique characteristics,
the agencies can hardly succeed in court41
IV. ABSOLUTE BAN
The analysis of the effect of absolutely banning any merger activities by the
Big Tech is highly economic. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that
every step the legislator takes is about consumer welfare, an economic factor.
A. Mergers in General
In the modern era, data is the “digital gold”. Some mergers and acquisitions
have the simple goal of acquiring the firm’s data. However, network effects and
increased switching costs can sometimes make this type of mergers undesirable.
Data is especially likely to create barriers to entry from the former effects when
paired with AI, which helps the Big Tech make better decisions. For example,
Facebook uses the data from its users’ newsfeeds to design products and services
for subsidiary companies like Instagram42 The latter effect is more viscous in
35 Tim Seppala, Google is Changing How Other Sites Use its Flight Data, ENGAGET (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.engadget.com/2017-11-01-google-flight-data-api-shutdown.html.
36 Dennis Schaal, Google’s Travel Business Is Already Twice the Size of Expedia’s, SKIFT (Nov. 1, 2016,
7:30 AM), https://skift.com/2016/11/01/googles-travel-business-is-already-twice-the-size-of-expedias/.
37 SEE GENERALLY DIANA L, MOSS, THE RECORD OF WEAK U.S. MERGER ENFORCEMENT IN BIG TECH,
AMERICAN
ANTITRUST
INST.
(JULY
8,
2019),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/Merger-Enforcement_Big-Tech_7.8.19.pdf.
38 ID. AT 7.
39 ID.
40 ID.
41 ID.
42 MIKE ISAAC, INSTAGRAM MAY CHANGE YOUR FEED, PERSONALIZING IT WITH AN ALGORITHM, NEW YORK
TIMES: TECHNOLOGY (MAR. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/technology/instagram-feed.html
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nature that: when a consumer becomes dependent with a platform, his data is
harvested by the platform; and this data is the platform’s leverage to stop
competitors from attracting the consumer because data is not easily transferrable
nor are the firms willing to; now because there are less attractions in the market
and the consumer already invested time and energy to the platform that he must
put up with some notorious digital platform strategies including changing
privacy policies, price discrimination against existing customers, and
discriminating against users who highly value a service43
If all mergers are banned for the Big Tech, barrier to entry in the market will
significantly reduce and the Big Tech’s leverage over the market is confined to
its current power. Consumers will in turn enjoy a more diverse market with much
healthier competitions. However, data was to provide better services from the
first place, and it is likely without the additional acquired data, the Big Tech’s
service quality will diminish.
B. Small Firms Operating in Related Markets
Mergers by the Big Tech have a kill-zone effect on small firms operated in
related markets. On the one hand, if the Big Tech enters the market by buying a
firm, it creates challenges for the rest to survive due to their network effects,
economies of scale and data driven economies of scope. This can scare off
investors as it is harder to survive – making it harder to pay back. On the other
hand, because of the former effect that the Big Tech usually only must buy one
firm to kill off the rest, some firms crave to be the “chosen one” in their racket.
That is these companies strived to be innovative with the purpose of going public
or getting acquired by bigger firms. Or in case of Facebook/Instagram, Facebook
CEO Zuckerberg threatens to create a similar product to compete if Instagram
did not agree to sell.
If an authority bans all the mergers from the Big Tech, more capitals will
flow into the market to cradle more innovation. And foreseeably the “first
mover” will start acquiring its smaller neighbours to grow. However, there are
studies to suggest that the Big Tech may have stronger incentives to develop the
innovation than the acquired firm when there are important supply-side and

(“INSTAGRAM PLANS TO RELY ON ITS MACHINE - LEARNING TECHNOLOGY AND A MIX OF SIGNALS TO DETERMINE
THE ORDER OF PHOTOS AND VIDEOS IN USERS’ FEEDS, INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD A PERSON WILL BE INTERESTED
IN THE CONTENT, THE TIMELINESS OF THE POSTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO USERS.”).
43 ALLEN P. GRUNES, ANOTHER LOOK AT PRIVACY, 20 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 1107, 1132 (2013).

2022]

THE BIG BAN(G) THEORY

63

demand-side synergies between both firms’ products44 Thus, the analysis of the
absolute ban is hinged on the balance between the acceleration of the
development of innovation and the elimination of competition.
C. Horizontal Mergers
Horizontal mergers by two major players are usually synonyms to a higherlevel a of market entry barrier. A case to illustrate, although not by the Big Tech,
is Bazzarvoice/PowerReviews.45 The merger was challenged by the DOJ
because the merger would have rendered an almost oligopoly market and as a
result would substantially lessen the effective competition in the market by
raising the entry barrier. Besides creating difficulties to entry, in a zero-price
market (where most of the Big Tech operated in), the platforms extract surplus
from the other side of the markets, including advertisers, developers, and 3rd
party producers etc, instead of directly from the consumers. And these parties
on the other end will make profits by selling their services to the consumers. The
net result of two major platforms merging is they can use their increased market
power to ask for higher advertising fees (possibly the case of
Facebook/Instagram), which will be retrieved by the vendors by increasing their
price. Ultimately it is the consumers who pay the bills.
However, Zhou46 argued that not all horizontal mergers by the Big Tech raise
competition concerns. For example, Microsoft/Yahoo!, both were unimportant
undertakings in the online advertising market and way behind the market leader
Google. Their merger enabled the entity to compete with Google, instead of
raising entry barriers to deter other competitors’ innovation efforts. He argued
the merged entity also promoted both disruptive and incremental innovation in
the online search engine field.
In considering banning all horizontal mergers, three categories can be
identified: Microsoft/Yahoo! and Bazzarvoice/PowerReviews are as
demonstrated to be sitting at two extreme ends; and Facebook/WhatsApp can
probably be a third category because they, as EC identified, “can be easily

44

MARC BOURREAU & ALEXANDRE DE STREEL, BIG TECH ACQUISITIONS: C OMPETITION AND INNOVATION
EFFECTS AND EU MERGER CONTROL, CENTRE ON REGULATION IN EUROPE, AT 11 (FEB. 2020),
https://cerre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/cerre_big_tech_acquisitions_merger_control_EU_2020.pdf.
45 UNITED STATES V. BAZAARVOICE, INC., 2014 WL 203966 (N.D. CAL. JAN. 8, 2014).
46 SIYOU ZHOU, MERGER CONTROL IN DIGITAL ERA, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN LAW, AT
33 (2021) https://fide2020.eu/fide-2020/young-fide-seminar/.
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threatened by nascent competitors”47 It is not a clear-cut answer to whether a
complete ban on horizontal mergers can benefit the consumers, especially,
considering most mergers and acquisitions are of non-horizontal nature between
2008 to 201848
D. Killer Acquisitions
This term was introduced by Cunningham in 2020. It means to buy only to
discontinue. This happens in 6% of the pharmaceutical merger cases the author
investigated comparing to 60%49 in the Big Tech mergers. There are three types
of killer acquisitions: first, killing one that has overlap between the core product
of the incumbent and the target innovation; second, killing the target innovation
which overlaps with the non-flagship offering on either side of the incumbent;
third, the target innovation complements a neighbouring product50 The third one
is unique to digital platforms and is argued to be the most difficult to the agencies
as it involves speculation. Because such mergers appear to be non-horizontal at
first glance, but due to digital market’s unique nature, the entering into the
acquirer’s market by the target from its neighbour market is not impossible (e.g.,
Facebook/Instagram, PayPal/ Honey). Such tactics by the Big Tech might
explain the earlier comment on most of the mergers being non-horizontal for the
past decade.
In considering the horizontal mergers as a whole, despite certain advantages
associated with Microsoft/Yahoo! type of case, there are many uncertainties in
terms of the consequences of the mergers, especially when no Big Tech
companies would reveal ex-ante what their intentions might be.
E. Non-Horizontal Mergers
In the market of a particular service, let’s say purchasing music, clothes, or
even plane tickets, there are consumers, the platform (Big Tech), and the
upstream service providers. If the platform merges with the service provider.
Two things are likely to happen to the disadvantage to the consumers: one, there
is going to be preferential access which restricts the consumers’ options; two,
47 SUMMARY OF THE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION TO THE EVALUATION OF THE MARKET DEFINITION NOTICE,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
9
(2020),
HTTPS://EUR-LEX.EUROPA.EU/ LEGALCONTENT/EN/TXT/PDF/? URI=PI_COM:ARES(2020)7730543&FROM=EN.
48 ELENA ARGENTESI ET AL, EX-POST ASSESSMENT OF MERGER CONTROL DECISIONS IN DIGITAL MARKETS,
LEAR, 20 (2019) (DOCUMENT PREPARED BY LEAR FOR THE COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY).
49 ALEX GAUTIER & JOE LAMESCH, MERGERS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, AT 8 (2020)
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_8056.html.
50 ZHOU, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 35.
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the platform company can use the data gained from external suppliers and design
their upstream selling strategies to benefit their own. This foreclosure will
manifest in several ways including self-preferencing, tying, bundling practices
and disproportionate access rules and platform participation fees.
If an authority bans all mergers, the supply of services will arguably become
less rigged and upstream service providers will be fighting harder to provide
better and cheaper goods and services through the platform to please their
consumers. The overall consumer welfare will increase.
However, there are certain advantages associated with vertical integration.
Lina Khan51, the present FTC director, analysed the pros and cons of a “vertical
separation regime” – to separate the role of sellers and the platforms (Big Tech)
– which is the opposite of being integrated. There are a few points to take away:
First, integration can eliminate double markups. If an authority bans all the
vertical mergers, it faces losing certain cost savings, resulting in higher prices.
And this is a competing interest with innovation in the market (lower the
interference from the platforms, higher the innovation by other players). Second,
integration motivates platform innovation. This is because by allowing the
platform to compete more aggressively, they collect one, additional profits; two,
uniquely valuable business intelligence; and three, greater leverage over
complementors52 Banning all vertical mergers will stifle all mentioned activities
and thus diminishing the platform’s incentive to invest, hence less innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
The US Antitrust on Big Tech has been clearly lacking partially because of
the record of weak enforcement of both horizontal and vertical mergers in
general; and partially accredited to the complex nature of the digital platform
that the Big Tech are operated in. Although the legal analysis was based on the
US, the economic impact of the Big Ban(g) Theory applies to economies around
the globe. As demonstrated, there are pros and cons to the absolute ban, but
horizontal mergers pose more concerns than the vertical ones. It might not be a
great idea to impose an absolute ban as it is likely to create a pre-mature per se
illegal rule. There are other options available: i.e., a Congressional Research
Service report53 called for a complete shifting of burden of proof, shifting from
51

LINA M. KHAN, NOTE, THE SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1098

(2019).
52

Id.
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46739 (2021).
53

REP.

NO.

46739,
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defining the relevant market, and shifting focus from consumer welfare. In
making the legislative decisions, it is ultimately the economy as a whole that
must be considered.

